This paper investigates the relationship among a firm's managerial incentive scheme, the market liquidity of its shares, and its investment policy. It shows that the shareholders' concern about the effectiveness of stockbased compensation can lead to an overinvestment problem. However, unlike other explanations in the literature, our results are not caused by suboptimal incentive contracts, nor do they rely on the assumption that managers are "empire-builders". Rather, overinvestment serves to induce information production by outside investors. By accepting positive as well as negative NPV projects, a firm effectively increases the market's uncertainty about its cash flow, which gives traders more incentives to become informed. The increased information flow into the market improves the informativeness of the stock price and, thus, enables shareholders to design more efficient managerial compensation contracts. Our analysis demonstrates that if investors are sufficiently risk averse, overinvestment is a more effective way to improve market monitoring than increasing market liquidity by floating more shares. It further shows that suboptimal investment decisions are more prevalent when the stock market is booming and that these distortions pose a systematic risk to investors that cannot simply be diversified away.
Introduction
Financial markets have long been recognized as an important means of monitoring the management of publicly held companies. By aggregating information from dispersed investors, stock prices provide firms with measures of managerial performance that cannot be extracted from other sources (e.g., accounting data). Tying top management compensation to the firm's stock price therefore offers shareholders a simple way of overcoming managerial incentive problems. In this article, we investigate how the shareholders' concern about the effectiveness of stock-based compensation contracts influences a firm's optimal investment policy.
Our analysis begins with the simple insight that a firm's investment policy affects the investors' incentives to collect information on the future value of the firm. By accepting investment projects with a negative net present value (NPV) in addition to those with a positive NPV, a firm can effectively increase the market's uncertainty about its cash flow and thereby enhance the trading profits of informed investors. Overinvestment therefore serves as a means of improving market monitoring. The greater the variation in expected returns on investment, the more profitable it is for investors to acquire information. The increased information flow into the market makes stock prices more informative about the manager's level of effort. This enables shareholders to design more efficient managerial compensation contracts and thus helps to reduce agency costs.
The efficiency of stock markets in monitoring managerial performance crucially depends on the liquidity of the market. A liquid market allows informed investors to better hide their trades in the larger order flow provided by uninformed traders, and thus enhances the value of their information. Conversely, in an illiquid market, prices fully reveal the traders private information and there are no gains to collecting information. The above argument implicitly assumes that the market for the firm's shares is sufficiently liquid to allow investors to recover their expenses for collecting information by profitably trading on this information. Directly, then, the cost of market monitoring is borne by uninformed liquidity traders. However, realizing that they will lose money on trades with better informed investors, these traders demand a liquidity premium for holding the firm's shares. Thus, indirectly the initial owners of the firm have to pay for the investors' monitoring service in the form of a reduced price when they issue shares to the public. 1 In a dynamic analysis of the costs and benefits of passive monitoring, market liquidity should, however, not be considered exogenous to the firm's problem. If the initial owners of the firm decide to float a larger fraction of their shares to the public, the trading activity of uninformed investors who trade for liquidity reasons is likely to increase, making it easier for informed investors to disguise their trades. The more shares are actively traded, the stronger are the incentives for investors to become informed. The benefits associated with the increased price informativeness have to be contrasted with the higher liquidity premium demanded by uninformed investors.
Naively, one might think that a firm will always try to improve the liquidity of its stock by selling more shares to the public before resorting to overinvestment as a means of inducing information production, because the latter not only increases the liquidity premium required by uninformed investors, but also reduces the value of the firm. Our analysis shows, however, that this is not necessarily the case. In particular, we demonstrate that if investors are risk averse, overinvestment can be a more efficient way to stimulate market monitoring than increasing market liquidity. The reason is that, under the first-best investment policy, investors have to trade more shares and, hence, bear a higher risk to earn the same expected profit as in the overinvestment case. Thus, depending on their risk aversion, overinvestment can substantially reduce the risk premium demanded by investors. This means that less liquidity is needed to induce information production, which benefits the initial owners of the firm, since they have to issue shares at a discount with respect to their fundamental value. If investors are sufficiently risk averse, this reduction in liquidity cost will outweigh the loss in firm value due to the inefficient allocation of investment resources.
Interestingly, the firm's optimal investment strategy depends on past stock returns, even if the market does not have more information about prospective investment projects than managers. In particular, we show that overinvestment is a more effective instrument for motivating investors to collect information if the firm's stock price is high. This result has two interesting implications. First, the announcement effect of a new investment project on stock prices is historydependent; in fact, the post-announcement price level is negatively correlated with pre-announcement returns. Second, the manager's investment decision conveys less information to shareholders if the announcement is preceded by positive abnormal returns. This means that the volatility of post-announcement returns is an increasing function of pre-announcement prices.
Finally, by extending our basic model to allow for industry-wide productivity shocks, we show that overinvestment caused by the firm's efforts to improve market monitoring poses a systematic risk to investors that cannot simply be diversified away. Specifically, we find that firms optimally choose to accept negative NPV projects at the same time, namely, when the stock market as a whole is booming. This means that investments are more strongly correlated across firms than the correlation between fundamentals would suggest. Moreover, it implies that risk averse investors will demand a higher expected return for holding shares of firms that are more susceptible to this kind of investment distortion.
The idea that firms systematically overinvest originated with Jensen (1986) . Jensen argues that when managers have more cash than is needed to fund all of the firm's profitable investment projects, they have an incentive to invest the excess cash in unprofitable projects, because they can reap personal benefits from controlling more assets. Jensen focuses on the role of debt and dividends in inducing managers to pay out free cash flow and considers board monitoring and takeover threats as disciplinary devices to curtail overinvestment. 2 In contrast to Jensen's theory, our argument does not rely on the fact that managers derive private benefits from investing. In fact, inefficient investments could easily be avoided in our model without raising the compensation payments to the manager. However, this would not be in the shareholders' best interest, since overinvestment is the most efficient way to improve the informativeness of stock prices and thus to reduce agency costs. In other words, it is not the manager who has an incentive to overinvest but rather the owners of the firm. In that sense, our approach complements Jensen's argument.
Starting with Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) , numerous articles in the theoretical literature have stressed the importance of stock-based compensation schemes in aligning the interests of management and shareholders. 3 Most of them, however, treat the firm's ownership structure as exogenous and neglect its impact on market liquidity and thus on the informativeness of the stock price. An exception is the seminal paper by Holmström and Tirole (1993) . In their model, a firm's optimal ownership structure is determined by the trade-off between the benefits of an increase in managerial effort and the costs of a lower issuance price for shares. However, Holmström and Tirole do not address the question of how stock-based compensation contracts affect the firm's optimal investment policy. The optimal managerial contract only serves to resolve the incentive problem related to the manager's effort choice.
A number of papers have studied the relationship between stock-based incentive contracts and the efficiency of managerial investment decisions. Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) present models in which the manager's action choice is hidden from outside investors. The manager has private information about the firm and cares about short-term stock prices. Both models predict that managers will underinvest in order to enhance current cash flow, which is taken by the market as a favorable signal. In contrast, Trueman (1986) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) show that if the manager's investment decision is observable, firms tend to overinvest in the hope of being viewed as having a profitable investment project. Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) also demonstrate that excessive concern over the current stock price can motivate managers with superior information to manipulate the market's inferences through observable investment choices. In their model, the result of this myopic behavior can be either overinvestment or underinvestment. However, none of these papers directly models the inherent conflict of interest between managers and shareholders that would justify the use of stock-based compensation. As a result, distortions of the optimal investment policy are induced by the managerial incentive contract, rather than by the underlying agency problem. This is in stark contrast to our analysis. Instead of specifying an ad hoc managerial objective function, we endogenously derive the optimal compensation scheme and focus on the role of suboptimal investment decisions as a means of improving market monitoring. In this respect, our approach is closer to the work of Dow and Gorton (1997) , who study the role of stock markets in guiding corporate investments in a world where managers must be given incentives to exert a high level of effort and to implement the optimal investment policy. However, Dow and Gorton do not deal with the effects that a firm's ownership structure and investment policy have on the investors' incentives to acquire information. Market liquidity is exogenously determined by the inelastic demand of liquidity traders. Further, by depriving these traders of alternative investment opportunities, Dow and Gorton implicitly assume that the cost of market monitoring is borne by liquidity traders.
Empirical research has not kept pace with the theory. To date, there is no systematic empirical evidence linking market liquidity and corporate investment to managerial incentive contracts and the informativeness of security prices. Recent studies show, however, that market liquidity has a significant impact on a firm's cost of capital. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that a portfolio of stocks in the top quintile of the liquidity distribution outperforms a portfolio of stocks in the bottom quintile on average by 0.55% per month (after adjusting for the Fama and French risk factors). Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) estimate that a difference of 10 percentage points in the probability of information-based trading between two stocks leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5% per year. More importantly for our purposes, the studies by Garvey, McCorry, and Swan (1996) and by Garvey and Swan (2002) indicate that market liquidity does play an important role in executive compensation. Using a sample of over 1,500 publicly traded US corporations, Garvey and Swan document that managerial compensation is significantly more sensitive to stock prices when the firm's shares are more actively traded. Similarly, Garvey, McCorry, and Swan find that CEO incentives from stock options, dismissal, and bonus payments are strongly positively related to the average price change caused by a trade of $ 1 million. Both papers support the hypothesis that stock prices convey valuable information about the CEO's performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic setting. Section 3 describes the equilibrium of the model and analyzes the interaction among market liquidity, price informativeness, and optimal investment policy in the single-firm case. Section 4 extends the basic model to allow for correlated productivity shocks across firms. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
We consider an economy with a single firm employing a technology of uncertain productivity. The firm is all-equity financed and has a single, perfectly divisible share outstanding. It is run by a manager and owned by three different types of investors: (i) inside owners, who hold shares for long-term capital appreciation and do not trade in the secondary market; (ii) liquidity traders, who initially buy shares for investment purposes but may later experience a liquidity shock which forces them to sell their assets; and (iii) speculators, who can produce information about the future value of the firm and make money by trading on that information. Besides the firm's shares, market participants can also invest in a riskless bond. The bond is in perfectly elastic supply and its interest rate is normalized to zero.
The model takes place over times 0, 1, and 2. Inside owners float a fraction of their shares to the public at time 0, shares are traded on the open market at time 1, and the firm is liquidated at time 2. We now turn to the details of the model.
Firm and Inside Owners
The firm is established at t = 0. At this time, inside owners hire a manager to run the firm and offer her a contract that maximizes the value of the firm net of the cost of managerial compensation. Further, they decide on selling a fraction α of their shares to the market at a price P 0 that is determined so that liquidity traders earn zero expected profits.
At time 1, the firm can invest in a project that requires $ 1 2 of investment. If the project succeeds, it yields a terminal cash flow of $ 1 at time 2; if it fails, the payoff is zero. The probability of success depends on the project's quality q, which can be high (q = h) or low (q = l). We assume that the investment is worth undertaking when the quality is high, but not when it is low: h = (1 + θ)/2 > 1 2 > (1 − θ)/2 = l, with θ ∈ (0, 1). This assumption also ensures that the payoff variance of high-quality and low-quality projects is identical. For simplicity, we also assume that the systematic risk of the project is zero. The true quality of the project is known to the manager but not to investors (except for the speculator, who can choose to produce information about q). We assume that the firm has sufficient cash to fund the investment project. If no investment is made, the value of the firm's assets is $ 1 2 . The decision to invest in a project is public information.
Alternatively, the firm's investment decision can be interpreted as a decision of whether to abandon a previously initiated project after reassessing its prospects at time 1. Early termination of a low-quality project saves the firm $ 1 2 − l, on average. With this alternative interpretation, the question then becomes whether market monitoring contributes to suboptimal liquidation decisions.
Manager
The firm is run by a manager who is hired in a competitive labor market. The manager is risk neutral, has no wealth, is protected by limited liability, and has a zero reservation level of utility. 4 After having signed a compensation contract with the founders of the firm, the manager has to make two decisions. At time 0, she can exert an unobservable effort, e ∈ {0, 1}, to enhance the quality of the firm's investment project. Specifically, we assume that, by incurring a private utility cost Ψ, she can increase the probability of having a high-quality project (q = h) from 0 to 1 2 . Thus, managerial effort (i.e., choosing e = 1 rather than e = 0) produces an expected cash flow gain of θ/4 (assuming that only positive NPV projects are accepted).
At time 1, after having observed the quality of the investment project and the stock price P 1 , the manager has to decide whether to invest in the new project. 5 We allow for the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria and let λ(q, P 1 ) denote the probability that the manager invests in a project of quality q when the firm's stock trades at price P 1 . As our analysis of the stock market equilibrium in Section 3.1 will show, there are only two possible first-period stock prices, denoted by P + 1 4 The assumption of risk neutrality on the part of the manager is only made for tractability and is not crucial to our results. Having a risk averse manager would make it more costly for shareholders to induce her to undertake risky projects and, hence, would reduce the amount of overinvestment in equilibrium, but would not alter our basic conclusions.
5 As will become clear in Section 3.3, P1 is a crucial factor in the manager's investment decision, even though it does not convey any information about q that the manager does not already have.
and P − 1 . Thus, the manager's investment strategy is fully characterized by the vector λ = (λ
To distinguish the cause of overinvestment in our model from other explanations that have been advanced in the literature, we assume that the manager derives no nonpecuniary private benefits from investing. This ensures that overinvestment is not a result of the manager's desire to control a larger firm (i.e., "empire-building").
The manager's compensation can be contingent on the firm's stock price performance. The payment she receives at time 2 will generally depend on both the time 1 and the time 2 stock price and is denoted by m(P 1 , P 2 ). 6 Following Holmström and Tirole (1993), we assume that the compensation payment is made by inside owners. This ensures that there is no interaction between the managerial contract and equilibrium stock prices, which considerably simplifies our analysis without affecting the payoffs to the different parties. We should note, however, that if shareholders are protected by limited liability, this compensation agreement implicitly imposes a restriction on the fraction of shares inside owners can float at time 0, since their liquidation proceeds, (1 − α) P 2 , have to exceed the compensation payment m(P 1 , P 2 ) in all states of nature. In the ensuing analysis, we assume that this restriction is not binding.
Finally, we assume that the manager is prohibited from trading in the firm's stock. This is consistent with insider trading laws in most countries, since the manager has privileged information regarding her own future investment decision.
Speculator
There is a single risk averse speculator in the economy who can collect information on the quality of the firm's project, q, before the stock market opens at time 1. By incurring a cost K, the speculator learns the true quality of the project with probability δ (this event is denoted by s = q). With probability 1 − δ, she does not receive any useful information about q (denoted by s = ∅). Based on her information, the speculator then submits an order for d S shares of the firm's stock to the market maker. We assume that the speculator's risk aversion prevents her from buying shares at time 0, i.e., before she observes her private signal s.
The speculator's preferences are represented by the mean-variance utility function U (w) = E[w] − R V ar [w] , where w denotes the speculator's terminal wealth and R her risk aversion coefficient. We believe that the speculator's risk aversion adequately captures the diversification concerns of "active" investors (i.e., investors who actively gather information and try to make money by trading on it). Unlike other investors, the speculator has to put a substantial amount of her wealth in the firm's stocks in order to recover the cost of collecting information. This prevents her from holding a well-diversified portfolio. Inside owners and liquidity traders, on the other hand, will not gather information because the fixed costs involved outweigh their (infinitesimal) gains from this activity. These investors can therefore fully diversify their portfolios and thus are effectively neutral to the firm's (unsystematic) risk.
Liquidity Traders
At time 0, there is a continuum of (infinitesimally small) investors who are willing to buy the firm's shares from inside owners. However, unlike inside owners, these investors, which we call liquidity traders, may suffer short-term "liquidity shocks" that force them to buy or sell a number of shares equal to the amount they hold, independent of the market price. Buying could be the result of (unmodeled) portfolio rebalancing considerations, whereas selling could represent a sudden need for funds. For simplicity, we assume that these shocks are perfectly correlated across liquidity traders and that the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock is 1 − δ. In that event, liquidity traders are equally likely to be buying or selling. Thus, the total time 1 stock demand from liquidity traders is either d L = α or d L = −α with equal probability. Following Dow and Gorton (1997) , we further assume that the occurrence of a liquidity shock is perfectly negatively correlated with the arrival of an informed speculator (i.e., with the event s = q). 7 As in Kyle's (1985) model, liquidity traders serve the purpose of disguising the trades of the informed speculator. Otherwise, prices would fully reveal the speculator's private information, and there would be no gains to collecting information. It is important to note, however, that the number of shares liquidity traders are forced to trade when they suffer a shock, α, will be strategically chosen by the initial owners of the firm. Thus, as in Holmström and Tirole (1993) , the liquidity of the market is endogenously determined.
Stock Market
At time 1, the firm's stock is traded in a competitive market-making system and a price is formed in a simplified version of the Kyle (1985) model. Speculators and liquidity traders submit their demands to a risk neutral market maker who sets the price and acts as a counterpart to all trades. The market maker observes the Time 0: • Inside owners sign a compensation contract with the manager.
• Inside owners publicly sell α shares to liquidity traders.
• Manager chooses effort level e.
• Speculator decides whether to collect information.
Time 1: • Speculator receives signal s and submits order d S .
• Liquidity traders may experience a shock and submit order d L .
• Market maker sets price P 1 and trading takes place.
• Manager observes q and P 1 and makes her investment decision.
Time 2:
• Firm is liquidated and proceeds are divided among shareholders.
• Manager is compensated. individual orders of the two (groups of) traders, but not their identity. Bertrand competition among market makers leads to zero expected profits, so that P 1 equals the expected value of a share, conditional on the observed order flow. 8 The sequence of events in the model is summarized in Table 1 .
Overinvestment in the Single-Firm Case
In this section, we characterize a (mixed strategy) equilibrium that features overinvestment in the single-firm case. The equilibrium concept we use is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). 9 Formally, a PBE of our economy is (i) a compensation contract m(·) that induces the manager to maximize shareholder value,
(ii) an ownership structure α that maximizes the wealth of inside owners, (iii) an optimal decision by the speculator on whether to produce information and, if so, a trading rule d S (s) that maximizes her expected utility, (iv) an effort choice e and investment strategy λ for the manager that maximize her expected compensation, given her remuneration contract and the informativeness of stock prices, and (v) a pricing rule P 1 for the market maker that sets the price equal to the expected value of the firm, conditional on the observed order flow and the market maker's beliefs about the speculator's trading strategy and the manager's investment policy.
In the ensuing analysis, we will place restrictions on the exogenous parameters of the model to ensure that inducing a high managerial effort is always optimal. 10 This assumption is justified by our focus not on the relationship between managerial effort and firm performance, but on the interaction between market liquidity, investment efficiency, and agency costs. We are particularly interested in equilibria in which the speculator chooses to collect information. In these equilibria, which we call informative equilibria, the date 1 stock price conveys valuable information about the manager's effort choice to shareholders and thus helps them to design a more efficient compensation contract.
Stock Market Equilibrium
We first solve for the equilibrium in the stock market. The prices of shares in the three periods are denoted by P 0 , P 1 , and P 2 . The date 2 price is simply the project's terminal cash flow if the manager decides to invest and 1 2 otherwise. 11 This is a consequence of our assumption that the manager receives her compensation payments from inside owners.
The informativeness of the date 1 stock price depends on the speculator's decision whether to produce information, which in turn depends on her expected trading profit and, hence, on the fraction of shares held by liquidity traders and on her beliefs about the manager's effort choice and investment strategy. To simplify our analysis, we restrict our attention to the more interesting case in which the manager exerts a high effort (e = 1) and the firm therefore has a chance of 1 2 of having a high-quality project. If the manager chose not to work (e = 0), it would be common knowledge that the firm's investment project is of bad quality and the speculator would have no incentive to collect information. In Section 3.2, we will impose restrictions on the manager's cost of effort, Ψ, ensuring that shareholders find it beneficial to offer a compensation contract that induces effort by the manager.
We begin our analysis of the stock market equilibrium by deriving the speculator's optimal trading strategy d S (s) and the market maker's pricing rule P 1 (d), taking as given the equilibrium ownership structure α, the investment policy λ, and the speculator's decision to collect information. Subsequently, we show that 10 See Assumption 1 in Section 3.2. 11 Alternatively, P2 could be interpreted as accounting data.
an informative equilibrium always exists when the cost of information production, K, is sufficiently small.
Since the aggregate order submitted by liquidity traders is either d L = α or d L = −α, the speculator can profitably trade on her information only by buying α shares when she receives good news (s = h) and selling α shares when she receives bad news (s = l). Indeed, a buy or sell order for any amount other than α would be identified by the market maker as originating from the speculator, thus revealing her information and destroying her opportunity to make a trading profit. Further, buying (selling) shares when s = l (s = h) would generate a loss. Also, submitting an order when the signal is uninformative (s = ∅) is a strictly dominated strategy, since the speculator is not compensated for bearing the risk of an uncertain project payoff when a risk neutral market maker is present. Thus, the speculator's profit-maximizing trading strategy can be summarized as follows:
Clearly, this strategy is optimal for a risk neutral investor. But since the speculator is risk averse, she may be better off not trading at all, if the expected profit does not provide sufficient compensation for risk. We will address this problem after calculating the speculator's expected utility and require conditions on the risk aversion coefficient R that ensure that the speculator's expected utility from adopting the above trading strategy is nonnegative in all states of nature.
Having characterized the investor's trading strategies, we now turn to the market maker's pricing rule. The market maker sets the price P 1 equal to the expected asset value, conditional on the observed order flow. We again restrict our attention to informative equilibria and provide conditions under which the market maker's beliefs about the speculator's behavior coincide with her actual behavior. When the speculator follows the trading strategy specified by (1), there are generally two possible prices, one for a buy order and one for a sell order. This is a consequence of our assumption that the occurrence of a liquidity shock is perfectly negatively correlated with the arrival of an informed speculator. A buy order could originate from either an informed speculator with favorable information or from liquidity traders, and the equilibrium price will reflect the chances of each. Similarly, a sell order could be caused by either liquidity needs or unfavorable information. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium prices as a function of the observed order flow.
Lemma 1 For a given investment policy λ, the date 1 stock prices in an infor-mative equilibrium are
Based on these prices and the speculator's trading strategy, we can now calculate the expected trading loss of liquidity traders and the expected utility of the speculator if she decides to produce information.
Lemma 2 For a given ownership structure α and investment policy λ, the liquidity traders' expected aggregate trading loss in an informative equilibrium is
The speculator's expected utility from producing information and trading on it is
Not surprisingly, the speculator's expected trading profit is increasing in market liquidity, α, the precision of her signal, θ, and the investment activity of the manager, λ; it attains a maximum at δ = 1 2 , since the uncertainty of the market maker about the identity of the trader is highest when liquidity traders and the speculator are equally likely to submit orders. A more liquid market (i.e., a larger α) allows the speculator to submit larger orders without being identified by the market maker and thus enhances the value of her information. But note that the speculator's expected utility is not necessarily increasing in α. A larger order size also means that the speculator faces a higher risk, possibly outweighing the gain in expected profits. The speculator benefits from a higher investment activity because it increases the difference between the expected asset value of firms with high-quality and low-quality projects. Interestingly, the expected profit depends only on the sum of the investment activity in all four possible states of nature, λ
From Lemma 2, it immediately follows that a sufficient condition for the trading strategy defined by (1) to be optimal is
where 1 (·) denotes the indicator function. This condition ensures that the speculator's risk-adjusted expected profit from buying (selling) α shares after having received good (bad) news is nonnegative. Thus, for a given ownership structure α and investment policy λ, there exists an informative stock market equilibrium if (2) holds and the speculator's ex ante expected utility U S (α, λ) is nonnegative (that is, if the information production cost K is sufficiently small). We conclude this section by deriving the stock price P 0 at which inside owners can sell α shares to liquidity traders. This price is set so that liquidity traders break even in expectation, given that they will have to trade against a better informed speculator at time 1. Thus, to calculate P 0 , we have to subtract the liquidity traders' expected trading loss (per share) from the expected firm value based on the investment policy λ.
Lemma 3 The date 0 price at which initial owners can sell α shares to liquidity traders is given by
where V 0 (λ) denotes the ex ante value of the firm gross of managerial compensation payments, which is equal to
This shows that the speculator's monitoring service is not offered for free to inside owners, since they are the ones who ultimately have to bear the liquidity traders' loss in the form of a reduced initial share price P 0 .
The Manager's Contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal managerial contract for the case of informative and uninformative stock prices and calculate the value of market monitoring to shareholders. We again assume that the manager's cost of effort, Ψ, is sufficiently small, so that shareholders optimally offer a compensation contract that induces the manager to choose e = 1 (see Assumption 1). The optimal contract therefore minimizes the expected compensation payments to the manager while satisfying limited liability and incentive compatibility constraints. The latter ensure that the manager has the right incentives to exert a high effort and to implement the desired investment policy λ. In other words, the model features an incentive problem related to the effort choice e (moral hazard problem) and an asymmetry of information related to the project quality q (adverse selection problem). The manager's compensation can be contingent on both the date 1 and the date 2 stock price, m(P 1 , P 2 ). Note that this assumption is without loss of generality, since P 2 fully reveals the manager's investment decision (P 2 is 0 or 1 if a project was undertaken and 1 2 otherwise).
We first solve for the optimal managerial contract when the stock price P 1 is uninformative (i.e., when the speculator does not produce information). In this case, the manager's compensation only depends on P 2 and there are only three different payments: m(·, 0), m(·, 1 2 ), and m(·, 1). Limited liability requires all payments to be nonnegative. Note that this also implies that the manager's participation constraint is trivially satisfied, since her reservation utility is zero. Suppose for the moment that shareholders want the manager to implement the first-best investment policy λ F B = (1, 1, 0, 0). Then, at the investment stage at t = 1, there are two constraints on the manager's behavior. First, she must invest in high-quality projects:
Second, she must not invest in low-quality projects:
Further, the compensation contract must induce the manager to make an effort at t = 0. Recall that choosing e = 1 instead of e = 0 increases the firm's chances of having a high-quality project from 0 to 1 2 . The manager's effort constraint is thus given by
Since an optimal contract minimizes the expected payment to the manager, this constraint has to hold with equality. Moreover, optimality requires that shareholders pay a manager with a low-quality project the minimum amount that makes her indifferent between investing and not investing, i.e., incentive compatibility constraint (4) has to be binding as well. The effort constraint (5) can then be written as
Since h − l = θ > 0, the minimum payments, consistent with limited liability requirements, that satisfy conditions (4) and (6) are therefore given by m(·, 0) = 0, m(·, 1) = 2Ψ/θ, and m(·,
Note that these compensation payments also strictly satisfy investment constraint (3). The unconditional probabilities for these payments are (1 − h)/2, h/2, and 1 2 , respectively, yielding an expected compensation of
In other words, C N is the limited liability rent the manager can extract from shareholders because the latter are limited in their punishments to induce effort provision and have to rely on rewards when a good state of nature is realized. Finally, for this remuneration contract to be optimal, we have to verify that its benefits to shareholders, in terms of a higher firm value, outweigh the expected compensation cost. By exerting a high effort, the manager can improve the firm's chances of having a positive NPV project from 0 to 1 2 . Thus, under the first-best investment policy λ F B , managerial effort generates an expected gain in firm value of 1 2 (h− 1 2 ) = θ/4. Shareholders will therefore find it optimal to offer the manager a performance-based compensation contract, if C N < θ/4, which is ensured by
We now turn to the more interesting case when the stock price at date 1 provides additional information about the manager's effort choice. When the speculator produces information and trades on it, price P 1 reveals the true quality of the firm's project with probability δ. With probability 1−δ, P 1 just reflects the demand shock of liquidity traders and does not convey any useful information. Thus, P 1 and P 2 are now two conditionally independent, informative signals about the project quality q. The conditional probability distribution of P 1 can be summarized by
Condition (3), which ensures that the manager has an incentive to invest in a highquality project, must now be replaced by the following two incentive compatibility constraints, one for each of the two possible date 1 prices P + 1 and P − 1 :
h m(P
Similarly, investment constraint (4) must be replaced by
These two conditions make sure that a manager with a low-quality project does not mimic the investment behavior of a manager with a high-quality project.
Finally, with an informative date 1 stock price, the manager's effort constraint is given by
where
) is the manager's expected compensation if q = h and
. In words, if the manager exerts effort, she incurs a cost Ψ and the firm has a high-quality project half of the time, which is reflected in a high stock price with probability µ > 1 2 . If, on the other hand, the manager decides not to exert effort, the investment project is of bad quality for sure, reducing the chances of observing a high stock price to 1 − µ. Again, the manager's participation constraint is implied by the limited liability constraints m(P 1 , P 2 ) ≥ 0 for all
Instead of solving the problem directly, we take a more practical route and argue that conditions (9) and (10) have to be binding at the optimum, thus pinning down the payments m(P ). If this were not the case, the contract would provide a manager who abstains from investing in a low-quality project a strictly higher compensation than what she would (on average) get by investing. Clearly, such a contract cannot be optimal, since shareholders could induce the same investment behavior at a lower cost by reducing the payments to managers who choose not to invest. Hence, conditions (9) and (10) have to hold with equality, which implies that conditions (7) and (8) are satisfied as well because h > l, leaving us only with the manager's effort constraint (11). This simplification reduces our analysis to a standard moral hazard problem with limited liability. 12 Having determined m(P Table 2 summarizes the ex ante probabilities of these four payments, π e (P 1 , P 2 ), as a function of the manager's effort choice e. The manager's effort constraint can then be expressed as
where ∆π(P 1 , P 2 ) = π 1 (P 1 , P 2 ) − π 0 (P 1 , P 2 ). An optimal contract that induces 12 See, e.g., Innes (1990) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) .
(P 1 , P 2 ) effort minimizes the expected payment to the manager,
subject to (12) and the limited liability constraints m(P 1 , P 2 ) ≥ 0 for all P 1 ∈ {P + 1 , P − 1 } and P 2 ∈ {0, 1}. Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier of (12) by κ and the respective multipliers of the limited liability constraints by ξ P 1 ,P 2 , we derive the first-order condition of the above optimization problem with respect to m(P 1 , P 2 ) as
with the slackness condition ξ P 1 ,P 2 m(P 1 , P 2 ) = 0. Thus, for the payment m(P 1 , P 2 ) to be strictly positive, we must have κ −1 = ∆π(P 1 , P 2 )/π 1 (P 1 , P 2 ). Since the multipliers κ and ξ P 1 ,P 2 have to be nonnegative at the optimum, this shows that a necessary condition for m(P 1 , P 2 ) > 0 is that managerial effort increases the probability of observing price path (P 1 , P 2 ), i.e., ∆π(P 1 , P 2 ) > 0. Moreover, it implies that the structure of the optimal payments is bang-bang. The manager receives compensation only in the state of nature with the highest ratio ∆π(·)/π 1 (·), which is state (P + 1 , 1) where both stock prices signal a high project quality (see Table 2 ). 13 Further, this payment is such that the effort constraint (12) is binding, i.e., m(P
In all other states, the payment is zero. With an informative date 1 stock price, the expected compensation payment to the manager is therefore
13 Table 2 shows that when δ > θ, only ∆π(P This result calls for several comments. First, it is important to note that the optimal contract rewards the manager only in the state of nature that is most informative about the fact that she has exerted a high effort. Indeed, ∆π(·)/π 1 (·) can be interpreted as a likelihood ratio. In other words, shareholders use a maximum likelihood ratio criterion to compensate the manager. 14 Further, the fact that m(P − 1 , 1) = m(P − 1 , 0) = 0 implies that, in addition to incentive constraints (9) and (10), constraint (8) is binding as well, which means that, when the stock price P 1 is low, the manager's investment decision does not affect her compensation. Consequently, under the optimal contract the manager is indifferent between investing and not investing, except when both the stock price and the quality of the project are high. Thus, the managerial contract specified above can be employed by shareholders to implement any investment policy λ at minimum cost as long as λ + h = 1. Finally, comparing C I with C N shows that market monitoring enables shareholders to design a more efficient managerial contract. An informative date 1 stock price reduces the cost of implementing a positive effort level by
Not surprisingly, the value of market monitoring is increasing in the manager's cost of effort, Ψ, increasing in the probability of an informed trade, δ, and decreasing in θ. The higher θ, the more accurately the cash flow P 2 reveals the project quality q, and, hence, the less valuable is the additional information conveyed by the stock price P 1 . In Section 3.3, we will contrast this reduction in agency costs with the minimum loss of liquidity traders necessary to induce the speculator to produce information. For clarity, we summarize our discussion in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If the stock price P 1 is informative about the project quality (i.e., if the speculator produces information and trades on it), the following compensation scheme induces the manager to exert a high effort and to implement the investment policy λ = (1, λ 
If the stock price is uninformative, the optimal compensation contract that induces the manager to exert a high effort is given by m(·, 0) = 0, m(·, 1) = m N , and m(·, 
Optimal Ownership Structure and Investment Policy
This section describes how the shareholders' concern about price informativeness can cause overinvestment. Specifically, we show that investing in a negative NPV project after a high stock price can be a more efficient way to compensate the speculator for her costly monitoring service than increasing market liquidity. The main conclusion from the previous section is that passive monitoring improves performance measurement, thereby reducing the share of the firm's assets that needs to be allocated to the manager to provide her with adequate incentives. This reduction in agency costs has to be contrasted with the monitoring cost. The speculator will incur cost K of producing information only if she expects trading on this information to yield a risk-adjusted profit of at least K. Directly, then, the cost of market monitoring is borne by liquidity traders. Indirectly, however, inside owners have to pay for it in the form of a discount on the initial share price P 0 , sufficient to assure that liquidity traders break even in expectation. The following proposition shows that, for a sufficiently low cost of information production, inside owners will choose an ownership structure and investment policy that induce market monitoring.
Proposition 1 For a sufficiently small cost of information production, K, an informative equilibrium exists.
For large values of K, solving for the optimal ownership structure and investment policy is trivial. In this case, there is no reason for shareholders to take their firm public. The savings in agency costs are not enough to recoup the cost of passive monitoring. Inside owners are better off retaining 100 % of their shares and compensating the manager based solely on the project's payoff P 2 . Further, it is clearly optimal to implement the first-best investment policy λ F B = (1, 1, 0, 0). 15 If the cost of information production is not prohibitive, the objective of initial shareholders is to choose an ownership structure α and investment policy λ that maximize their wealth given by
subject to the constraint that the speculator has incentives to perform the monitoring function, i.e., U S (α, λ) ≥ 0. We begin our analysis by comparing, for a given ownership structure α, the effects that small deviations from the first-best investment policy have on the speculator's utility and the inside shareholders' wealth.
From our preceding analysis of the stock market equilibrium, we know that the speculator's expected profit is increasing in the firm's investment activity. Specifically, it increases at the same rate in all four possible states of nature. Further, taking the risk-adjustment term in the speculator's utility function into account, we find that the speculator benefits more from an increase in λ + l than from an increase in λ − l . The reason is that λ + l does not affect the speculator's risk, since she never buys shares when the project quality is low. Finally, condition (2) ensures that a marginal increase in λ + l has a stronger positive effect on the speculator's expected utility than a marginal decrease in λ + h . In other words, if the speculator is not too risk averse, the loss in expected profits associated with a lower investment activity in state (h, P + 1 ) dominates the reduction in risk. From the shareholders' perspective, deviations from the first-best investment strategy are costly. Thus, any deviation that reduces the speculator's expected utility cannot be optimal. Moreover, investing in a negative NPV project is less detrimental to the shareholders' wealth when the stock price P 1 is high than when it is low, because from an ex ante perspective, the former state of nature only occurs with probability 1 − µ < 1 2 , whereas the latter occurs with probability µ > 1 2 . This implies that a marginal increase in λ + l is not only the most effective way to boost the speculator's utility, but it also causes the lowest reduction in firm value. 16 Proposition 2 Suppose condition (2) holds. Then, for a given ownership structure α, the most efficient way for inside owners to increase the speculator's expected utility by deviating from the first-best investment policy λ F B = (1, 1, 0, 0), is to increase λ + l , i.e., to increase the probability of investing in a low-quality project when the stock price is high.
In the ensuing analysis, we therefore restrict our attention to investment strategies characterized by λ = (1, 1, λ + l , 0) and focus on the trade-off between 16 Note that the expected compensation payment CI can be ignored in this analysis, since it is not affected by the firm's investment policy as long as λ + h = 1. λ + l and α. Both a higher market liquidity and a higher investment activity will typically increase the speculator's expected utility. Thus, as far as their ability to stimulate market monitoring is concerned, these two instruments are (to some extent) substitutes. They differ, however, in their effects on the shareholders' cost of monitoring. A more liquid market allows the speculator to trade more shares, which increases her expected profit but also her risk. This means that the risk premium the speculator demands will go up as well. Overinvestment, on the other hand, does not affect the speculator's risk, but decreases the shareholders' wealth by reducing the value of the firm. The following proposition shows that if the speculator is sufficiently risk averse, shareholders are always willing to trade a small amount of overinvestment for a lower risk premium.
Proposition 3 If the cost of information production, K, is sufficiently small, there exists a nonempty interval R, R such that for all risk aversion coefficients R ∈ R, R , the probability of investing in a low-quality project when the stock price is high, λ and consider first the case in which the manager follows the first-best investment strategy and only accepts positive NPV projects. The expected stock price at date 2 is then 3 4 if the project quality is high and 1 2 if it is low, and the ex ante expected value is 5 8 . Since the order at date 1 is equally likely to come from an informed or uninformed trader, the market maker will set the price P 1 equal to when she observes a sell order. The speculator's expected trading profit when she becomes informed is therefore equal to per share. This calculation shows that in the overinvestment case, the speculator's expected profit is twice as high. Now let us compare the risk premium the speculator demands in these two cases. When the manager follows the first-best investment strategy, the variance of the speculator's profit if she receives good news is This example shows that under the first-best investment strategy the speculator has to bear twice as much risk as in the overinvestment case in order to achieve the same expected profit. Thus, depending on her risk aversion, overinvestment can substantially reduce the risk premium she demands for participating in the stock market. This means that less liquidity is needed to encourage market monitoring, which benefits inside owners, since they have to sell shares at a discount with respect to their fundamental value to liquidity traders. If the speculator is sufficiently risk averse, this reduction in liquidity cost will outweigh the loss in firm value due to inefficient investments.
Proposition 3 has several interesting implications. First, it shows that share price-based incentive contracts can entail overinvestment, even though managers do not derive private benefits from investing. Our theory thus complements other explanations that have been advanced in the literature. For example, Jensen (1986) argues that when managers have more cash than is needed to fund all of the firm's profitable investment projects (i.e., free cash flow), they have an incentive to invest the excess cash in unprofitable projects, because they can reap personal benefits from controlling more assets. In contrast to Jensen's argument, our theory does not suggest a positive correlation between investment and free cash flow. Our model assumes that firms have sufficient funds to undertake all investment projects. But even when firms have to raise external capital to finance new projects, they may overinvest, because it is the most efficient way to improve the informativeness of the stock price and thus to reduce agency costs. Put differently, it is not the manager who wants to (raise funds to) overinvest but rather the owners of the firm.
Propositions 2 and 3 further imply that past stock prices influence the manager's investment decision, even though they do not convey any useful information about investment opportunities. In particular, managers follow the signals given by the stock market even when those do not coincide with their own assessment of fundamentals. As in Dow and Gorton (1997) , rising stock prices cause higher investment. 17 But in contrast to their model, we restrict the market from having information that the manager does not have. The only reason why shareholders want the manager's investment decision to be guided by stock prices is to enhance the speculator's incentives to collect information and thus to improve the stock market's monitoring role. In other words, the retrospective role of stock prices, which allows shareholders to design more efficient managerial compensation contracts, gives rise to a forward-looking or prospective role as well. Looking at (a time series of) stock returns and capital expenditures, one might therefore falsely conclude that managers infer valuable information about investment opportunities from stock prices.
Consistent with empirical evidence, our model predicts a significant rise in the stock price upon the announcement of a new investment project. 18 The magnitude of this announcement effect, however, depends on past stock returns. If the announcement is preceded by negative abnormal returns, the post-announcement price level will be equal to h, the fundamental value of a high-quality project. However, if the announcement follows a period of positive abnormal returns, the price will generally be lower than h, reflecting the fact that the investment decision might have been triggered by high stock prices and not by favorable information about the project's profitability. Thus, according to our theory, the manager's investment decision conveys less information to shareholders when the pre-announcement stock price is high. Consequently, the volatility of postannouncement returns increases with pre-announcement prices. We should note, however, that these results are not unique to our model. A model where the market has relevant information about investment projects that is not available within the firm could generate the same predictions.
Our model also suggests an alternative to the management entrenchment hypothesis as an explanation for the nonmonotonic relation between firm performance and managerial incentives, documented by several empirical studies. 19 For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that the market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's q, first rises as management ownership increases up to 5%, then falls as the ownership increases up to 25%, and finally rises slightly at higher ownership levels. They attribute the initial increase to the better alignment of the incentives between managers and outside shareholders and the later decrease to the increased scope for entrenchment by managers. For sufficiently high ownership levels, managers are able to undertake investments that entrench themselves in their jobs rather than maximize the value of the firm. Our model shows that inefficient investments may also serve to motivate speculators to produce information and thus to improve the informativeness of stock prices. Especially when the manager's cost of effort and, hence, her in-centive compensation are high, overinvestment may be a more efficient way to to encourage market monitoring than increasing market liquidity. 20 Thus, firm performance is not necessarily increasing in managerial incentives.
Comparative static analysis and empirical predictions
To obtain a better understanding of what kind of firms are most susceptible to overinvestment, we now examine how the optimal ownership structure and investment policy respond to changes in the model primitives K, θ, δ, and R. The following proposition presents comparative static results for the optimal ownership structure, α * , under the assumption that the cost of information production, K, is sufficiently low, so that an informative equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4
In an informative equilibrium that features overinvestment, the optimal number of shares issued to the public, α * , is an increasing function of the cost of information production, K, and the signal precision, θ, and a decreasing function of the speculator's risk aversion, R, and the intensity of informed trading, δ.
Due to the mathematical complexity of the model structure, we have to rely on numerical simulations to derive comparative static results for the optimal investment policy. Unless otherwise stated, all figures presented here are based on the following parameter values: K = 1 50 , θ = 2 3 , δ = 1 2 , and R = 1. 21 In this base-case scenario, the optimal ownership structure and investment policy are characterized by α * = λ * (l, P + 1 ) = 3 5 . A key factor in the determination of the optimal ownership structure and investment policy is the speculator's risk aversion. A higher risk aversion coefficient R means that the speculator demands a greater risk premium. This makes overinvestment a more attractive tool for shareholders to induce information production. Indeed, a higher market liquidity would not only increase the expected value of the speculator's trading profit but also its variance (at an even faster rate). It is therefore not surprising that, at an interior optimum with λ * (l, P + 1 ) > 0, an increase in the speculator's risk aversion leads, ceteris paribus, to more overinvestment and a more concentrated ownership structure (see Figure  1) . 20 Note that a high cost of managerial effort makes market monitoring more valuable. Thus, even when K is large, it is worthwhile for shareholders to induce the speculator to collect information. This is accomplished by floating more shares and by increasing investment (see Figure 2) .
21 Although the figures are based on specific sets of parameter values, the qualitative relations described by these figures appear as general results of our model based on a wide range of parameter values with which we experimented. An alternative and probably more interesting interpretation of these results is that firms with riskier projects invest more and earn, on average, lower returns on their investments. Intuitively, this is the case, because the higher the project risk, the more effective overinvestment becomes in inducing information production.
An increase in the cost of information production K also reduces the speculator's expected utility. However, unlike an increase in R, it has no effect on the risk-adjustment term. Thus, in order to keep the same level of market monitoring, inside shareholders will generally find it optimal to compensate the speculator's loss associated with a higher K by increasing both the number of shares sold to the public and the firm's level of investment (see Figure 2) .
Unfortunately, it is difficult to relate the speculator's information production cost to observable firm characteristics like size and industry affiliation. Although empirical studies show that larger firms typically have higher analyst coverage which tends to reduce the adverse selection costs of transacting, 22 it is not obvious how this affects the incremental value of private information. The matter is further complicated by the fact that firm size and analyst coverage are also related to the intensity of informed trading, δ. . This leads to a lower market liquidity α * and a lower investment activity λ * (l, P + 1 ). However, an increase in δ also influences the relative efficiency of these two instruments. In fact, the more often the speculator trades, the more risk she has to bear. This means that shareholders will save more on monitoring costs by reducing market liquidity rather than by cutting back investments. For high enough values of δ, this latter effect dominates the decrease in λ * (l, P + 1 ), leading to the counterintuitive result that overinvestment is increasing in the intensity of informed trading.
An increase of the signal precision θ has a similar effect. On the one hand, a higher θ makes the speculator's information more valuable and thus increases her expected trading profit. It also reduces her residual risk. This would suggest that lower levels of α * and λ * (l, P + 1 ) suffice to induce information production. On the other hand, however, a higher θ means that overinvestment becomes more expensive for shareholders, since the NPV of low-quality projects is a decreasing function of θ. Thus, inside shareholders are better off by increasing investment efficiency and issuing more shares (see Figure 4) . As mentioned above, the manager's cost of effort, Ψ, does not directly affect the optimal ownership structure and investment policy in our model. Indirectly, however, a higher cost of effort makes market monitoring more valuable and thus enlarges the set of environments in which shareholders are willing to pay for it. Overinvestment may therefore be an indication of an environment where it is costly for managers to conduct control-related activities.
Overinvestment with Two Firms
We now turn to the case where, instead of one firm, there are two firms, indexed by i ∈ {A, B}, that have correlated productivity shocks. We show that overinvestment resulting from the shareholders' efforts to improve market monitoring increases the correlation between investments across firms. The reason is that both firms optimally invest in negative NPV projects at the same time, namely, when both stock prices are high.
We assume that the two firms are controlled by different managers who simultaneously make their investment decisions at time 1, after having observed the stock prices P 1,A and P 1,B . As before, managers can improve the quality of investment projects by exerting effort. To allow for the possibility of industrywide productivity shocks, we modify our basic model, presented in Section 3, as follows. By incurring a utility cost of Ψ, each manager can increase her firm's probability of having a high-quality project from 0 toν, whereν is the same for both firms and is equally likely to be either (1 + ν)/2 or (1 − ν)/2 with ν ∈ [0, 1]. The value ofν is not known to the manager at time 0 when she makes her effort choice. Thus, this assumption does not change the ex ante expected increase in firm value through managerial effort. It only affects the correlation of the quality of the two projects, which (in an equilibrium with high effort) can be shown to be Corr(q A , q B ) = ν 2 . For simplicity, we assume that there are no production externalities. The payoff of firm A's investment project is independent of firm B's investment decision and vice versa. As before, there are three types of traders active in the stock market at time 1: speculators, liquidity traders, and market makers. All of them have essentially the same characteristics as in Section 2. There are now two speculators, each able to produce information about one of the firms. That is, by incurring a cost K, speculator A (B) learns q A (q B ) with probability δ. The event of receiving an informative signal is assumed to be independent across speculators. Note that this implies that the occurrence of a liquidity shock in the two markets is independent as well. 23 To keep the model tractable, we further assume that the correlation between q A and q B is sufficiently small and that speculators are sufficiently risk averse, so that each speculator only trades shares of the firm for which she has observed an informative signal. With these simplifying assumptions, the speculators' trading strategy in this extended version of the model is identical to that specified in Section 3. As before, stock prices are determined by a perfectly competitive market-making sector. Each market maker observes the demand for both stocks before quoting her prices. Depending on the order flow (d A , d B ) ∈ {−α, α} 2 , there are now four possible prices for each stock, denoted by P
Thus, the positive correlation between q A and q B makes price P 1,i more informative about project quality q i . The details of the stock market equilibrium are given in the Appendix. Each firm's investment policy is then characterized by the vector
denotes the probability that firm i invests in a high-quality project when the demand for both stocks is high (the other probabilities are defined analogously).
The increased price informativeness enables shareholders to design a more efficient managerial contract. For simplicity, we assume that each manager's compensation can only be contingent on her own firm's stock prices P 1,i and P 2,i . Using the same techniques as in Section 3.2, it is straightforward to show that the optimal managerial contract is given by m i P ++ 1,i , 1 = 8Ψ/ (δ + θ)(1 + δ ν 2 ) and m i P ++ 1,i , 1 2 = l m i P ++ 1,i , 1 . All other state-contingent payments are zero. 24 As before, the manager receives compensation only in the state of nature that is most informative about the fact that she has exerted a high effort. The manager's expected compensation is given by
Not surprisingly, C I,i is decreasing in ν. The stronger the correlation between q A and q B , the more informative is the demand for stock j about the project quality of firm i. It is important to note that this contract can be used to induce the manager to exert a high effort and to implement any investment policy λ i with λ ++ i,h = 1 at minimum cost. We are particularly interested in how correlated productivity shocks across firms affect the manager's optimal investment strategy. To this end, we again compare the effects of overinvestment on the speculator's utility and on the initial shareholders' wealth in different states of nature, in order to determine the most efficient way to compensate the speculator for her costly monitoring service. We begin our analysis by calculating the expected trading profit (loss) of speculators (liquidity traders), L i , and the ex ante value of the firm gross of managerial compensation payments, V 0,i :
From the discussion in Section 3.3, it follows that underinvestment (i.e., not investing in positive NPV projects) is never optimal. It reduces the value of the firm as well as the speculator's expected profit. Further, overinvestment is a more efficient way to increase the speculator's utility when the order flow d i indicates a high-quality project. This can also be seen from (15) i,l does not affect the riskiness of the speculator's trading strategy, because she never buys shares when the project quality is low (if q i = l, she either receives the signal s i = l or the signal s i = ∅). Thus, the only remaining question is how the demand for stock j influences the optimal investment strategy of firm i. Is it more effective to encourage market monitoring by investing in negative NPV projects when stock prices of other firms are high as well? The answer to this question follows immediately from (15) 
overinvestment is therefore less costly for shareholders of firm i when the stock price of firm j is up as well. This, in fact, establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For any ν > 0, the most efficient way for the inside owners of firm i ∈ {A, B} to increase the speculator's expected utility by deviating from the first-best investment policy is to increase λ ++ i,l , i.e., to increase the probability of investing in a low-quality project when the demand for shares of both firms is high.
Proposition 5 has several interesting implications. First, it shows that investments are more strongly correlated across firms than the correlation between fundamentals would suggest. This is in stark contrast to models which attribute the overinvestment problem to the manager's desire to control more assets. In these models, investment decisions become stochastically independent across firms when the correlation between fundamentals goes to zero.
Proposition 5 further suggests that the correlation between stock returns is state-dependent. If the stock market is down, the manager's decision to invest clearly indicates a high-quality project. However, if the market is up, the manager's investment decision becomes a less reliable predictor of the firm's prospects. Thus, controlling for the firms' investment decisions, we would expect stock returns to be more strongly correlated when the stock market is declining.
Finally, proposition 5 implies that overinvestment poses a systematic risk to investors that cannot simply be diversified away. For any arbitrarily small ν > 0, firms optimally choose to undertake negative NPV projects "at the same time" (i.e., in the same state of nature), namely, when the stock market as a whole is booming. 25 Thus, in a more complex model where prices are not determined by risk neutral arbitrageurs, investors would demand higher expected returns for holding shares of firms that are prone to this kind of investment distortion.
Conclusion
This paper develops an optimal contracting model that allows us to explore the relationship between managerial compensation schemes, market liquidity, and the firm's investment policy. Our main result is that when the market's information structure is endogenously determined, the use of stock price-based incentive contracts can lead to an overinvestment problem which includes the acceptance of negative NPV projects. However, unlike other explanations that have been advanced in the literature, our results do not rely on the assumption that managers are "empire-builders", i.e., that they derive nonpecuniary private benefits from controlling more assets. In fact, it is not the manager who has an incentive to overinvest but rather the owners of the firm. In an attempt to reduce agency costs, shareholders are willing to accept small distortions of the optimal investment policy in exchange for more informationally efficient stock prices. Put differently, in our model inefficient investments serve to induce information production by outside investors. Specifically, we show that if investors are sufficiently risk averse, overinvestment is a more effective way to stimulate market monitoring than increasing market liquidity by floating more shares to the public.
Interestingly, the manager's optimal investment strategy depends on past stock prices, even though they do not convey any useful information about the firm's prospects. In particular, we find that overinvestment is more efficient in terms of inducing information production when the firm's stock price is high. Moreover, extending our basic model to a framework with economy-wide productivity shocks, we show that this result generalizes to the multi-firm case. For any arbitrarily small correlation in fundamentals, firms optimally choose to invest in negative NPV projects when the stock market as a whole is booming. This means that the investment distortion identified in this paper poses a systematic risk to investors that cannot simply be diversified away.
Our analysis has abstracted from a number of interesting issues. By assuming that managers always observe the true quality of the firm's investment project, we essentially reduce the function of the stock price to that of transferring information about the manager's past effort choice. In a more complex model where prices also convey valuable information about investment opportunities, firms would have even stronger incentives to overinvest, because the associated increase in price informativeness would also help managers to make more efficient operating decisions. We strict the speculator from trading shares after the investment decision has been made but before the project's payoff is realized. Introducing a second trading round would obviously increase the speculator's trading profit if the manager's investment decision did not fully reveal the quality of the project. Thus, in this case, overinvestment would be even more efficient in inducing information production. We should note, however, that a second trading round could create incentives for uninformed investors to manipulate the stock price via trade, if it affects the manager's investment decision. 26 For simplicity, we have also ignored a number of alternative measures a firm can take to improve the informativeness of its share price. For example, a firm can influence the market's information structure through its disclosure policy. However, voluntary disclosure does not necessarily lead to more efficient stock prices, since it reduces the investors' incentives to acquire costly information. 27
Another interesting direction for future research would be to include the firm's choice of securities into our framework and explore its interaction with the optimal investment policy. Common intuition suggests that issuing more informationsensitive securities causes less investment distortions. Our theory might therefore have important implications for the firm's optimal capital structure policy and for security design in general. In fact, preliminary results in this regard show that bank debt typically helps to diminish the overinvestment problem although it does not fully eliminate it. The problem becomes more complicated, however, if the firm issues risky bonds in addition to stocks, since informed investors will then have an incentive to trade both securities. 28 We hope to have provided a framework that will prove useful in future attempts to analyze these important issues.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that the manager exerts a high effort (i.e., e = 1) and that the speculator produces information and follows the trading strategy defined by (1). Then, P r(q = h) = 1 2 and
Thus, the probability of having a high-quality project conditional on the order flow d is given by
For a given investment policy λ = (λ
, the expected date 2 payoff conditional on order flow and project quality is
From the market maker's perspective, the expected value of the firm conditional on observing a buy order is therefore given by
Similarly, upon observing a sell order, the market maker sets the price equal to
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that the manager exerts a high effort (i.e., e = 1) and that the speculator produces information and follows the trading strategy defined by (1). Then, for a given ownership structure α and investment policy λ, the expected value and the variance of the speculator's trading profit,L, are given by Since the market maker breaks even on average, the expected profit of the speculator must be equal to the expected loss of liquidity traders.
Proof of Lemma 3
For a given investment policy λ, the ex ante value of the firm gross of managerial compensation payments is equal to Since liquidity traders expect to incur a loss of L(α, λ) when they suffer a liquidity shock and are forced to trade at time 1, the highest price at which they are willing to buy α shares from inside owners is given by
At this price, the liquidity traders' expected return from investing in stocks is equal to that from investing in bonds (which is normalized to zero).
Proof of Proposition 1
The cost of market monitoring to inside owners is given by the liquidity premium L(α * , λ * ) demanded by uninformed liquidity traders on the one hand, and by the reduction in firm value due to inefficient investments, V 0 (λ F B ) − V 0 (λ * ), on the other. In an informative equilibrium, the optimal ownership structure α * and investment policy λ * are chosen to minimize these costs subject to the constraint that the speculator has an incentive to collect information, i.e., U S (α * , λ * ) ≥ 0.
In the limit as the cost of information production, K, goes to zero, this constraint is trivially satisfied, since condition (2) requires the speculator's expected utility from trading to be nonnegative in all states of nature. Thus, in the limit, the optimal ownership structure and investment policy are given by lim K↓0 α * = 0 and lim K↓0 λ * = λ F B . This implies that the upper bound imposed on R by condition (2) goes to infinity and that the costs of market monitoring converge to zero. Thus, if K is sufficiently small, the benefits of market monitoring given by C N − C I > 0 clearly outweigh the costs and inside owners will choose an ownership structure and investment policy that induce information production by the speculator. This proves that for small enough values of K, an informative equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 3
In an informative equilibrium, the speculator's participation constraint has to be binding and the optimal ownership structure α * and investment policy λ * solve the following program:
Note that L(α, λ) is linearly increasing in α. Lettingα(λ) denote the smallest positive root of the quadratic equation U S (α, λ) = 0 in the interval [0, 1] (or settingα(λ) = 1, if there is no root in the unit interval), we can therefore rewrite the above program as follows:
and α * =α(λ * ). Clearly, if R is too high, the speculator is better off by not trading at all and no informative equilibrium exists. From Proposition 2, we know that the most efficient deviation from the firstbest investment policy is to increase λ + l . Thus, in order to prove Proposition 3, it suffices to show that there exists a risk aversion coefficientR satisfying condition (2), such that dG(λ) dλ
for all R >R. Suppose that K is sufficiently small, so thatα(λ F B ) < 1. Then, ≡R.
Note thatR satisfies condition (2), since
(1 − δ) θ α(λ F B ) (1 − θ 2 ) 1 + δα(λ F B )
This proves that there exists a nonempty interval R, R such that for all R ∈ R, R , the probability of investing in a low-quality project when the stock price is high, λ + l , is strictly positive in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that there exists an informative equilibrium that features overinvestment and let α * and λ * = (1, 1, λ + l , 0) denote the optimal ownership structure and investment policy, respectively. Since the constraint λ + l ∈ [0, 1] is not binding, we can solve for the optimal value of λ + l by setting the speculator's expected utility equal to zero:
Substituting this expression into the inside owners' objective function, we derive the first-order condition for an interior maximum with respect to α as
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we therefore have dα * dR = − (1 + 2 δ α * ) α * 2 R (1 + 3 δ α * ) < 0, dα * dK = 4 R δ (1 − θ 2 )(1 + 3 δ α * ) α * > 0, dα * dθ = θ (1 + 2 δ α * ) α * (1 − θ 2 )(1 + 3 δ α * ) > 0, dα * dδ = − (α * ) 2 1 + 3 δ α * − 4 K R δ 2 (1 − θ 2 )(1 + 3 δ α * ) α * > 0.
Stock Market Equilibrium with Two Firms
Suppose that the managers of both firms exert a high effort (i.e., e A = e B = 1) and that both speculators produce information and follow the trading strategy defined by (1). Then,
= µ δ P r(q B = h | q A = h) + (1 − δ)( 
